ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine the impact of uplink spectrum allocation on the backhaul energy allocation in a decentralized setting. We consider that two small base stations (SBSs) use the band from two spectrum owners to provide the uplink wireless transmission service and that two SBSs use a common renewable power supplier (RPS) to forward the uplink traffic. The wireless traffic will be forwarded to a gateway or macrobase station via the backhaul link. We study the system under a decentralized scenario, where SBSs (wireless operator), the spectrum owner, and the green energy supplier interact with each other. We formulate the interaction as a Stackelberg leader-followers game. The operator acts as the Stackelberg leader by choosing the energy and spectrum prices that it will pay to the RPS and the owner, respectively. Then, the RPS and the owner simultaneously determine the renewable energy storage and bandwidth allocation. We prove that for any set of resource prices, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the followers' resource allocation game. We also show that the wireless network operator's optimal resource prices lie in one of two regions-one that leads to energy and spectrum allocation balance and one that does not. Furthermore, in the centralized system, we present a characterization of the unique optimal solution. The proposed scheme enables the SBSs to jointly decide to use green energy over backhaul links while properly allocating spectrum resources for wireless uplinks. Finally, the results show that the proposed scheme achieves a system performance comparable to that of a centralized solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years, wireless access networks have become more heterogeneous to provide ubiquitous coverage with relatively expensive resources, i.e., dense small cells can be connected via backhaul/fronthaul links to improve the network throughput and expand the wireless communication range [1] . At the same time, explosive data traffic demands and exponential increases in the number of wireless subscribers have driven significant growth in the energy consumption of wireless network systems, with the energy cost constituting a tremendous part of a wireless communication system's operational cost [2] , [3] . To address this situation, more and more mobile operators have considered powering their base stations (BSs) using a green energy supply, such as solar sources. For instance, the Huawei company has deployed renewable-powered BSs in some Asian countries [4] . However, renewable energy (e.g., energy harvested using solar panels) is not like traditional energy from a grid, which is steady in nature and can have stable availabilities over time and space. As a result, renewable energy storage, with a capacity-limited and expensive battery, is far from sufficient for one system to realize stabilization.
Recently, electricity grids have also experienced a paradigm shift from conventional grids to smart grids [5] - [9] . Meanwhile, as the distributed energy generation and storage technologies have become economically viable, the newly deployed smart grids have enabled grid operators to charge time-varying prices to cope with electricity consumers' timevarying loads, thus helping to stabilize energy generation and transmission [10] . This trend is further supported by regulators and policymakers, as energy sharing can contribute to improving the efficiency of power grid operations while also reducing power generation costs and CO2 emission [7] . In view of the new hybrid electricity market, it is essential for wireless operators to jointly optimize renewable and traditional energy purchases based on the time-varying wireless traffic load to minimize their energy costs.
In the new 5G RAN architectures, the baseband units will be connected to remote small cells via high speed fronthaul/backhaul links, which will have to carry a significant amount of traffic, thus consuming a large amount of energy. On the other hand, dynamic spectrum allocation has already received much attention from both communities regarding the mitigation of the inefficient fixed spectrum allocation policy to utilize the idle licensed spectrum in cognitive radio networks. Cognitive communication has been viewed as a promising paradigm for achieving energy-efficient communications. The key idea is to allow a cognitive radio device to adapt its configuration and transmission decisions to the real-time radio environment [11] . Energy harvestingbased cognitive radio networks have already played a vital role in providing joint energy and spectrum efficient solutions [12] - [16] . These existing works typically assume that all cognitive devices are equipped with energy harvesting devices, which may not be necessary for future smart grids, i.e., the renewable energy generated at one node can be shared with other nodes.
A handful of works have investigated networks powered by smart grids. To minimize electricity bills, a scheme is proposed in [17] to jointly optimize the day-ahead and realtime energy purchases based on the time-varying wireless traffic load. Han and Ansari [18] proposed a network utility aware (NUA) traffic load balancing scheme that optimizes user association to reach a tradeoff between green power utilization and traffic delivery latency. Leveraging the stochastic optimization formulation is proposed in [19] to allow data centers to adaptively respond to the intermittent availability of renewables under long-term quality-ofservice (QoS) requirements. In [20] , to address the intrinsic variability of renewable energy sources, an infinite-horizon optimization problem is formulated to obtain the optimal downlink transmit beam forming schemes, which are robust to channel uncertainties. Also, an infinite time-horizon resource allocation problem is formulated in [21] to maximize the time-averaged MIMO downlink throughput, subject to a time-average energy cost budget. These prior works mainly focused on the utilization of the renewable energy in wireless systems but did not account for the two-way energy distribution between smart grid and cellular networks.
Future 5G cellular networks with smart grids and new interoperable functionalities, such as real-time energy trading and future planning, will be of particular interest regarding the improvement of productivity [22] . Wang et al. [19] develop robust energy management and transmit beam forming designs to minimize the worst-case energy cost, via two-way energy trading, by using the convex optimization techniques. In [23] , each base station with local renewable energy generation is allowed to implement two-way energy trading with the grid, and joint energy trading and communication cooperation schemes are proposed. An energy cooperation technique is developed in [24] to improve the cost efficiency of cellular networks. In [25] , by considering the difference between energy buying and selling prices, the authors propose a two-way energy trading scheme to reduce the energy cost at the BSs. A two-way energy transaction mechanism is introduced in [26] to accommodate the RES variability, with maximization of the weighted sumrate of the MIMO broadcast channels. However, these works mainly used the centralized optimization models and ignored the problem of providing incentives for energy sharing. Moreover, such works are often focused on energy management schemes and do not consider using the cognitive spectrum in the networks. This issue is particularly important when jointly using renewable energy and the unlicensed cognitive spectrum in a decentralized resource market to provide wireless services.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
This paper first studies the joint renewable energy and spectrum allocation problem in a decentralized network with an independent renewable power supplier. We assume that two SBSs buy a spectrum band from owners to provide uplink access. There is one common RPS in the system to provide energy to SBSs so that they can set up a backhaul link. This use of a renewable power supply commonality is just one example of how the smart grid operational flexibility can be leveraged to improve wireless network responsiveness while avoiding excessive network inventories. On the other hand, using two SBSs in the model means that two different kinds of access services can be identified in the model. The energy storage and bandwidth allocation decisions should be made prior to the arrival of the traffic demands, which are stochastic. Therefore, it is important to effectively coordinate the usage of the energy storage units of the RPSs and spectrum band while considering a balance between reducing resource costs and maintaining service revenue for the wireless operator.
In the system, the operator first sets the resource prices it will pay to the spectrum owners and the RPS. After observing these prices, the owners choose how much bandwidth to reserve, and the RPS chooses how much energy to store. Then, the operator observes a wireless traffic demand and places the corresponding resource orders with the resource suppliers. We formulate the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We establish an analytical model for the Stackelberg game between multiple spectrum owners, one common RPS, and an operator with two kinds of service. Then, we characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) of the formulated game. In fact, we develop a proper business model that provides substantial incentives for the success of operation of such a decentralized network.
• We prove that for any set of resource prices, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the followers' resource reservation game. We then show that the operator's optimal resource prices lie in one of two regionsone that leads to resource allocation imbalance and one that does not. As a result, the operator can then compare profits associated with the best solution from each region and choose the better of the two.
• We then study the system under both centralized and decentralized decision making, thereby deriving insights regarding the inefficiencies that decentralization can cause in the system. We find that the proposed resource pricing scheme achieves a system performance comparable to that of a centralized solution.
B. RELATED WORK
Here, we briefly review the resource pricing mechanisms and Stackelberg game models for wireless networks in the current literature. As a pioneering work, Zhou et al. proposed VERITAS, a truthful and computationally efficient auction, to allocate spectra in an eBay-like dynamic spectrum market [27] . Thereafter, market-driven spectrum trading has been considered as a promising paradigm for CR-based spectrum allocation and has received considerable attention in recent years [28] - [34] . On the other hand, with the deployment of decentralized generation and storage technologies, energy trading has also gradually become a profit-making option for end users, who can partially fulfill their needs without further stressing the grid. There are several studies on demand response management in a smart grid [35] - [37] , where users adapt their demands to maximize their own utility based on the price information. We note that the Stackelberg game has often been used to model the difference in market behaviors between users and resource owners in the above context [30] - [32] , [36] , [37] . These works study the spectrum trading or energy trading issues independently. Specifically, Bu et al. [6] studied a Stackelberg game model where the leaders are assumed to be the micro grids to bid prices, and the game follower is the network operator. Then, the authors identify the Stackelberg equilibrium of the proposed game, which enables one to understand the decentralized operation for the smart-grid powered wireless networks in a distributed market. Such a model means that the grids have the first moving advantage. However, setting price by service providers may not be always the case for network issues. For example, the cognitive virtual operators are often considered to bid the prices for getting resources from spectrum owners via auctions [28] , [32] . In this paper, the cognitive virtual operator (base stations) is assumed to set the resource prices firstly. Then, the resource suppliers decide on the reservation strategies. Also, the proposed Stackelberg game model in this paper jointly considers the spectrum partitioning and renewable energy allocation. Again, consideration of the two kinds of wireless service in the dynamic Stackelberg game model constitutes another novelty of this work.
Guo et al. [38] propose a joint energy and spectrum cooperation scheme between different cellular systems to enable two neighboring systems to cooperate in their own resource sharing to reduce operation costs. However, the scheme does not account for resource market behaviors. A mixed integer-real optimization problem is proposed in [16] ; it jointly considers the base station switching and orthogonal subchannel allocation. A new metric, referred to as delay-sensitive area spectral efficiency (DASE) , is studied to analyze the performance of delay-constrained wireless networks [39] . The tradeoff analysis regarding energy consumption and QoS in hybrid energy supply wireless networks is investigated in [41] and [42] . In [42] , the influence of the reliability of cognitive radio on a smart grid is analyzed, and the relationship between outage and demand-side management performance is derived. Although there has been significant research on renewable-powered wireless systems, little work has been done to examine the resource allocation and pricing scheme between independent spectrum owners (SOs), renewable power suppliers (RPSs) and wireless operator/cognitive operators, particularly the impact on the QoS of such systems. More specifically, an independent SO, RPS and wireless operator/cognitive operator can interact with each other to provide flexible wireless services, thereby proving efficient the utilization of resources and reducing the network deployment cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system model and formulates the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Section III analyzes the joint renewable energy and spectrum suppliers' resource reservation game in a decentralized system and obtains the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium solution for resource suppliers. Section IV investigates the operator's resource pricing scheme based on the unique equilibrium solution of the followers' game. Section V examines the centralized optimal solutions, which are also analyzed. Numerical results are provided in Section VI, and the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK MODEL
Consider a HetNet consisting of two small base stations (SBSs) that are deployed within the coverage area of a macrocell. The SBSs are connected to the core network via a VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 1. Considered system, in which the SBS of the wireless network operator can purchase dedicated spectra and common renewable energy from three resource suppliers and forward the served traffic to a Maro BS or gateway via backhaul links.
wireless backhaul, which is used to transport the uplink data traffic, as shown in Fig. 1 . The two SBSs belong to the same wireless network operator. We consider that two SBSs buy a distinct spectrum band from their dedicated spectrum owners (denoted as A and C) to provide uplink access services to K 1 and K 2 users with bandwidths Q 1 and Q 2 (for clarify, we also denote Q 1 = Q A and Q 2 = Q C ), respectively. We assume that the users are allocated the bandwidth equally; thus, SBS i has the following total uplink information rate: Assume that one unit of renewable energy and α units of spectrum bandwidth can forward one unit of data traffic of SBS 1, while one unit of renewable energy and β units of spectrum bandwidth can forward one unit of data traffic of SBS 2. The main notations are listed in Table I . For example, assume that the backhaul link delivers the traffic for the data stream with a rate of R. Let P i and h i be the transmission power and the hop distance, respectively, for SBS i. As a result, for SBS i with the backhaul path loss L(h i ), we obtain
where w is the backhaul bandwidth. Let φ(w) = (e R/w −1)n 0 w R . Then, the energy demand E i to forward a traffic amount
L(h i ) . For one unit of energy, i.e., E i = 1 kWh, we can then define one unit of traffic amount as
φ(w) MB. Then, the required access bandwidth for one unit of traffic transmission in a time duration T is
MHz, i.e., Q 1 = α units and
B. UNCERTAIN TRAFFIC AMOUNT
Let D i (i = 1, 2) be the total mobile users' random traffic demand in cell i during a certain duration. Let f i (·) and F i (·) be the marginal density and cumulative distribution function for D i , respectively. In this paper, D i is assumed to follow an exponential distribution 1 with the CDF
Note that, the wireless traffic demands are stochastic. When the renewable storage is empty, the unfilled access is lost. Then, there is a QoS cost, and, the revenue of the operator will be reduced. However, to store more energy will induce more storage cost. In the studied model, we consider the off-grid BSs. But, our scheme also applies to the the on-grid BSs, i.e., when the storage is empty, the operator can switch to use the traditional energy, then, the operation cost also increases.
T denote the vectors of unit resource capacity costs, the operator's purchase price per unit resource and the resource capacity levels, respectively, for three resource suppliers. Denote Q −j , j ∈ {A, B, C} as the vector Q with the units of renewable energy or spectrum of resource supplier
T denote the vector of the selling price for unit data traffic, the expected number of units of SBS data traffic needed to satisfy mobile users' random traffic demand and the actual number of units of SBS data traffic capacity, respectively, for the two SBSs.
Without loss of generality, we assume that p 1 ≤ p 2 . Reserving a unit of renewable energy or spectrum capacity for resource supplier j costs c j . Reserving a unit of data traffic for SBS i costs zero, and to ensure that both SBSs have a positive profit margin, Based on the w chosen by the operator, each resource supplier j simultaneously chooses their individual initial energy or spectrum storage Q j that maximizes its expected profit given the capacities selected by all other suppliers. Via the vectors Q and D, we denote s j (Q, D), j ∈ {A, B, C} as the total number of units sold by each resource supplier j, and
At this point, the expected profit function of each resource supplier j can be expressed by
Then, the operator determines the w and y necessary to maximize its expected profit: 
D. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the decentralized system, the sequence of events for the formulated Stackelberg leader-follower game is as follows: First, the wireless network operator functions as the Stackelberg leader by selecting the purchase price w j it will pay to each resource supplier j for each unit of resource j provided; the utility function of the operator is given by (3) . Next, based on the purchase price, three resource suppliers synchronously reserve their resources with an amount Q j ; the utility functions of the suppliers are determined using equation (2) . As a result, the operator can estimate the total mobile users' random traffic demand and decide how much traffic it plans to serve. Then, it places the corresponding resource orders to the spectrum owners and the RPS. Finally, all costs and payoffs are incurred. The logic of the proposed game is shown in Fig. 2 .
For Stackelberg leader-follower games, the leader will select actions that will maximize its utility, subject to the followers' actions as estimated based on the leader's information. For the proposed game, we can prove that the followers' game has a unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. Thus, for the proposed game, the leader can maximize its utility by considering that the followers will choose the Pareto-optimal NE solution.
Definition 1: Define Q * (w) as the set of Pareto-optimal NEs that can be achieved for the followers' problem given the price w. For the proposed game, in which the operator moves first to specify the pricing strategy w and the suppliers move as followers to achieve Q * (w) (Q * (w) ∈ Q * (w)), the strategy profile (w * , Q * (w * )) is called a Stackelberg equilibrium if
The definition means that the operator will find the price that maximizes its utility under the worst-case followers' equilibrium. For the case where there is a unique Pareto-optimal NE for the followers' game, the obtained Stackelberg equilibrium will enable us to understand the following: 1) What is the resource price that a wireless network operator should pay the spectrum owners and RPS, accounting for the QoS cost?
2) How much bandwidth should the spectrum owners reserve, and how much energy should the RPS store, considering the resource prices?
To solve the proposed two-stage Stackelberg game and find the Stackelberg equilibrium, we use backward induction, in which we investigate joint renewable energy and spectrum suppliers' resource reservation game (stage II). Then, we investigate the operator's optimal pricing decision (stage I), as shown in Fig. 2 . The obtained solutions enable the operator to make an optimal resource price decision to use the common energy source and spectrum bandwidth from different owners. In other words, the proposed scheme is able to provide a kind of operational flexibility for the wireless operator in renewable-powered wireless networks with spectrum sharing.
III. ANALYSIS OF SUPPLIER FOLLOWERS' PROBLEM
To analyze the followers' problem, we first investigate the operator's decision regarding the amount of traffic to serve once the resource prices and reservation strategies for spectrum owners and the RPS have been set, respectively. Then, we explore the resource reservation game for followers, in which resource suppliers simultaneously select their reservation strategies, given the resource price vector w and anticipating the traffic service decision of the operator y(Q, D). VOLUME 6, 2018 A. OPERATOR'S DECISION REGARDING THE AMOUNT OF TRAFFIC TO SERVE We assume that SBS 2's data traffic has the higher margin, i.e.,
This implies that it is optimal for the operator to give priority to SBS 2's data traffic when choosing data traffic capacities. Based on (1) and (4), the operator's decision regarding the amount of traffic to serve y(Q, D) is obtained by maximizing (3) subject to
As a result, the operator's decisions regarding two kinds of service amounts are
B. RESOURCE RESERVATION GAME
To analyze the resource reservation game, we first define the Nash equilibrium (NE) in the game.
Definition 2:
The NE is a point at which no resource supplier has an incentive to improve its utility unilaterally; in other words, a set of actionsQ j ∈ Q j will be at NE if and only if
According to the above analysis and based on (3), (5), and (6), we can obtain the following result (Proposition 1) regarding the properties of the NE.
Proposition 1: The expected profit function of each resource supplier j is concave in Q j under the condition that the vector w of the operator's purchase prices satisfies (4). In addition, there exists at least one NE reservation vector Q(w) = (Q A ,Q B ,Q C ) in the joint renewable energy and spectrum suppliers' resource reservation game.
Proof: See Appendix A. To obtain the NE solution, we explore the suppliers' bestresponse functions. To this end, we first give the following definition.
Definition 3: We define δ AB (Q B ) as a solution to
We define δ BAC (Q A , Q C ) as the solution to
Furthermore, we define the following auxiliary variables:
As a result, we can obtain the following result. Theorem 1: Given an operator's purchase prices w satisfying (4), the resource suppliers' best-response functions are expressed as follows.
(I) Spectrum Supplier A: Fix a pair (Q B , Q C ) and assume that Q C ≤ βQ B . The best-response function of spectrum supplier A is
In addition,
The best-response function of renewable power supplier B is
In addition, if P(
(III) Spectrum Supplier C: Fix a pair (Q A , Q B ). The bestresponse function of spectrum supplier C is
Proof: See Appendix B. Indeed, the resource reservation game does not satisfy the conditions of the supermodular function. We identify the relationship between resource reservation strategies, by which the unique Pareto-optimal NE solution can be further obtained.
Proposition 2: Given a vector of the operator's purchase prices w satisfying (4) , if
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) is nondecreasing in Q B for any case.
Proof: See Appendix C. From Proposition 1, we know that there exists at least one NE for any vector w of the operator's purchase prices in the suppliers' resource reservation game. Although multiple equilibria may exist in the game, we will prove that the game always has a unique Pareto-optimal NE. To this end, we first define some auxiliary variables. Define the function
for cases withQ B = min Q B ,Q 2 B ,Q . Define N 2 as the feasible solution to
under the condition Theorem 2: There exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibriumQ(w) in the suppliers' resource reservation game for any vector of the operator's purchase prices w satisfying (4). Depending on the resource suppliers' reservation costs c and the operator's purchase prices w, the equilibrium takes one of the following forms.
( 
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPERATOR'S PRICING DECISION A. PRICING STRATEGY REGIONS
Based on the unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium resource reservation strategiesQ(w) in the suppliers' reservation game, the operator will select w such that its profit in the leader's game is maximized. By reducing and combining the pricing strategy regions, we find two new regions: one region leading to resource reservation balance and another leading to imbalanced resource allocations. We characterize these regions in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: The operator's optimal price strategy w lies in one of the following two regions. One region is
and any w in the region results in balanced resource reservation strategies, i.e.,
and any w in the region results in imbalanced resource reservation strategies, i.e.,Q(w)
Proof: See Appendix E. In summary, solving the operator's pricing problem requires a pair of numerical searches-one over w satisfying (15) and one over w satisfying (16) . The operator can then compare profits associated with the best solution from each region and choose the better of the two. The distributed operation of the algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Distributed Algorithm Used to Find the SE of the Proposed Stackelberg Game 1: Operator compares the profit of two regions (15) and (16) in Theorem 3 and chooses the optimal w, which must satisfy (1) and (4). 2: Operator's traffic amount y(Q, D) computed using (5) and ( 6: Obtain a unique Pareto-optimal equilibriumQ(w) in Theorem 2.
B. CENTRALIZED OPTIMAL SOLUTION
Under the centralized scenario, because there is no need for resource prices in this system, the central planner's problem can be modeled as a two-stage stochastic program. Working backwards, we first focus on the second stage, which occurs after the reservation vector Q of three resource suppliers has been selected and the expected data traffic vector D is observed. At this moment, the planner chooses the actual data traffic capacities vector y to maximize
Similar to the second-stage problem for the decentralized system, the decisions regarding the optimal operator service traffic amount are given in (5) and (6) . Then, in anticipation of possible demand outcomes and the above service decision, the central planner chooses the resource reservation vector Q to maximize the system expected profit:
The following results establish some properties of the centralized optimal resource reservation Q * . Proposition 3: The optimal resource reservation reserve strategy for the centralized system has the following properties:
(i) It is always optimal to reserve resources for all three resource suppliers, that is, Q * > 0. (ii) The optimal resource reservation satisfies the boundary
, if and only if
Proof: See Appendix F.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

A. PARAMETERS SETTING
For simulations, we choose the following parameters. The backhaul links for two BSs are assumed to be h 1 = 1 km and h 2 = 1.2 km. Each backhaul wireless link is assumed to be operated at the f = 60 GHz frequency. In simulations, the basic data rates of the backhaul are set to R = 100 Mbits/s. The backhaul links are set to have a bandwidth of w = 200 MHz. Note that by increasing both the backhaul data rate and the bandwidth, the transmit power of the backhaul node may not vary by much. For example, if we set a 500 Mbits/s backhaul data rate with a bandwidth of 1 GHz, then the backhaul transmission will have the same energy consumption. Moreover, we set λ 1 = 10 G bits and λ 2 = 12 G bits in the CDF of the traffic amount for a game duration T = 1 hour, which means that the traffic amount for each kind of service in the period follows an exponential distribution with a mean of λ i , i ∈ {1, 2} G bits. The noise power spectral density is taken as n 0 = −120 dBm/Hz. For the line of sight points, the free space path loss from Friis' law can provide a good estimation [41] and is given as
where γ = 2.2 is the path loss exponent and A = 16 dB/km is the oxygen-and-rain attenuation coefficient [43] . The main simulation parameters are summarized in Table II. For the renewable energy, a green pricing utility program of the US Department of Energy shows that the prices of different RPSs vary from approximately 0.5 cents/kWh to 5.0 cents/kWh [44] . We use cents as the power price unit. At the same time, due to the storage of green energy and transmission losses, the per-kWh cost of green energy is approximately 0.1 to 1 cent. In addition, from data-only plans, it is shown that the prices of different data traffic vary from approximately 7.2 cents/MB to 9.8 cents/MB [46] . For example, one can have 2 GB of data traffic if 15 dollars are paid to the network operator. These values fall within the range of the prices discussed in [45] - [47] .
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM
Recall that the wireless traffic demands of the operator are stochastic. When the renewable storage is empty, the unfilled access is lost. Then, there is a QoS cost, and the revenue of the operator will be reduced. However, storing more energy will induce more storage cost. In the simulation, we consider the off-grid BSs. However, our scheme is also applicable to the on-grid BSs, i.e., when the storage is empty, the operator can switch to using traditional energy; as a result, the operation cost also increases.
1) BALANCED AND IMBALANCED RESOURCE RESERVE STRATEGIES
In Fig. 3 , we plot the different regions for the Pareto-optimal NE solution that is characterized in Theorem 2, with c B / w B = 0.4, p 1 = 8 cents/MB, and p 2 = 9 cents/MB. Fig. 3(a) plots the different regions for the equilibrium analysis of the Stackelberg game according to Theorem 2. In region (i), the resource reservation of spectrum owner A is zero. Regions (ii) and (iv)(b) result in resource reservation balance, while regions (iii) and (iv)(a) do not. Correspondingly, Fig. 3(b) shows the operator's pricing strategies for the two regions. We can see that the resource reservation imbalance occurs in the shaded region and that the resource reservation balance occurs on the dashed curve. The operator can then determine its resource pricing strategy by comparing profits associated within each region. Fig. 4 plots the profit of the wireless operator for the imbalanced resource reservation with c A = c C = 1 cents/MHz. First, we set α = 0.68 MHz, β = 0.72 MHz, α = 1.36 MHz and β = 0.72 MHz. We can observe from the figure that the operator's profit increases with c A /w A . For example, the operator achieves the maximum profit when c A /w A ∈ {0.45, 0.55}. However, as β increases, the operator's profit slowly decreases. Specifically, the operator's maximum profit is approximately 1072 cents and 1210 cents for α = 0.68 MHz, β = 0.72 MHz and α = 0.68 MHz, β = 1.44 MHz, respectively. Fig. 5 shows the profit of the operator in the region of the balanced resource reservation. We can observe that the 
2) OPERATOR's OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGY
In the above analysis, we fixed c B /w B = 0.4, allowing the operator to compare profits associated with the best solution from each region and to choose the better of the two by using a pair of numerical searches in two regions. As a result, the operator is able to determine the price strategies w A and w C . Next, we vary c B /w B ∈ {0.05, 0.95} to find the optimal price strategy w b for the operator. In Fig. 6 , when α = 0.68 MHz, β = 0.72 MHz, α = 0.68 MHz, β = 1.44 MHz, and α = 1.36 MHz, β = 0.72 MHz, the operator achieves the maximum profit when c B /w B = {0.2, 0.5, 0.15}, respectively. Based on Fig. 3-5 , we can summarize the resource suppliers' Pareto-optimal equilibrium strategies, as shown in Table III . 
C. DECENTRALIZED SOLUTION VS. CENTRALIZED SOLUTION
In this subsection, we compare the decentralized solution with the centralized solution. Fig. 7 shows the profits of the wireless network operator in the centralized and decentralized system with α = 0.68 MHz, β = 0.72 MHz, p 1 = 8 cents/MB, and p 2 = 9 cents/MB. Using the equilibrium resource prices, we compute the profit of the operator in the centralized scenario. Then, we observe from the figure that the operator gains higher profit in the decentralized system than in the centralized system. This result occurs because in the formulated game model, the operator is the game leader; thus, the operator has the first moving advantage. Fig. 8 compares the overall system profits for the centralized solution and the decentralized solution. We can see from the figure that the system profit in the decentralized solution is slightly lower than that in the centralized solution as the spectrum cost of owner A increases. However, this gap does not exceed 5% relative to the centralized optimal solution. Note that all the results of the simulation account for two BSs within a certain operational duration, i.e., on hour. Even though such a value is seemingly small, this cost reduction can be significant when a large number of BSs are deployed in a network with a long duration of work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied joint energy and spectrum allocation with a renewable energy commonality in a wireless network system under a decentralized setting. We used one common renewable supplier and assumed that two SBSs buy a spectrum band from owners to provide uplink access with an uncertain traffic amount. Any traffic lost will reduce the QoS of end users and thus also impair the revenue received by the operator. We formulated the problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Then, we proved that for any set of resource prices, there exists a unique Pareto-optimal equilibrium in the suppliers' resource reservation game. We showed that the operator's optimal energy prices lie in one of two regionsone that leads to resource allocation imbalance and one that does not. This use of a renewable power supply commonality in our model can enable the operational flexibility to improve wireless network responsiveness while avoiding excessive network inventories. Also, the analytical and simulation results reveal several interesting insights regarding how the RPS, spectrum owners, and operator affect each other in green cognitive heterogeneous networks. Furthermore, the results also demonstrate that an operator can achieve a higher profit than that achieved in a centralized solution by using the proposed scheme.
APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: For a given Q j and D,
is piecewise linear and concave, as D) is also concave. Then, the existence of a Nash equilibrium follows from [47] .
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: (a) Best-Response Function of Spectrum Owner A. Consider spectrum supplier A's profit function
We can obtain
where
thus, the first half of (18) follows immediately. For Q A > Q A , we have from (18) that
Note from (19) that if we can find a reservation Q A that satisfies
= 0, then that is spectrum supplier A's best response. However, such a point may not always exist. Let δ A (Q B , Q C ) be spectrum supplier A's best-response function.
Recall thatQ 1
A solves w A e
(b) Best-Response Function of Renewable Power Supplier B. Consider renewable power supplier B's profit function
Then, (21) can be written as in Definition 3. Now, fix a pair (Q A , Q C ). It is easy to verify that the lefthand side of Definition 3 is decreasing in Q B and that as Q B approaches
. As a result, the optimal energy reservation strategy of (c) Best-Response Function of Spectrum Supplier C. Consider spectrum supplier C's profit function
If Q B ≥Q 2 C β , spectrum supplier C's optimal spectrum reservation isQ β > Q B . Thus, the optimal reservation value is Q C = βQ B . As a result, spectrum supplier
as Q B ≤Q B and
. As a result, for
β , we can obtain 
. As a result,
Again, we can obtain
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: We first analyze the range min(
β . We do so by considering four different cases with respect to the fractiles 1 − c A /w A , c B /w B and c C /w C .
(
which is equivalent toQ 2 
Then, for Q B to be part of an equilibrium, we must have
, where the last equality follows since 
β ; otherwise, the preceding argument applies here as well. Thus, there is no equilibrium in this range. For 
is the Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The analysis for other regions is similar to that for (i).
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: Consider the four purchase-price regions identified in Theorem 2 (i)-(iv). Now, for any vector w in region (i), the operator could decrease w C until c C /w C = c B /w B and
β . A vector w in region (i) satisfying c C /w C = c B /w B also lies in region (ii). Thus, the optimal prices will never fall in the interior of region (i). For any vector w in region (ii) such that N 2 =Q 1 A , the operator could decrease either w B or w A until N 2 =Q 1 A . Since this increases the operator's margin without affecting the three resource suppliers' equilibrium reservation strategies, this again increases the operator's profit and thus reduces region (ii) to a region in which w satisfies 1 − c C /w C ≤ c A /w A = e β , thus increasing its margin without affecting the three resource suppliers' equilibrium resource reservation levels. Note that after such a change,
Thus, the new purchase price vector remains in region (iv)(a). Thus, this region can be reduced by adding the condition 
(i) Clearly, Q = 0 can never be optimal. First, assume that Q * = (0, Q, βQ), with Q > 0. In this case, v B = v C = η 3 = 0; thus, (25) ∼ (26) become: 
Substituting ( 
